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Guaranteeing Defined Contribution Pensions:  
The Option to Buy Back a Defined Benefit Promise 
 
Defined contribution (DC) pension plans have been the primary engine of growth in the 
US private pension market over the last two decades.   The public sector has traditionally been 
more tied to defined benefit (DB) pension plans, but recently several state legislatures have 
introduced DC plans for their public employees.  A DC plan offers participants flexibility, 
portability, and investment portfolio choice, all of which can improve an employer’s ability to 
attract and retain workers.
1 But investment risk that had been assumed by the plan sponsor under 
the DB promise is transferred to the worker in a DC plan (Bodie, 1990). 
  Some public pension sponsors, therefore, have sought to provide a form of guarantee so 
employees will not be penalized by the conversion to a DC plan.  This paper analyzes the 
potential costs to employers associated with a guarantee in which the employee covered by a DC 
plan is allowed to return to the DB plan, in exchange for a pre-specified price.  We refer to this 
guarantee as the “buy-back” option, and we show that the potential costs involved with the 
provision of such a guarantee are easily misunderstood and can be quite large. 
  To evaluate the potential magnitude of the costs associated with a buy-back option, we 
explore two alternative designs recently developed by the State of Florida in implementing a 
statewide pension reform.  Using numerical estimates, we show that the likely costs of Florida’s 
buy-back option are substantial.  If the employees were to exercise the buy-back option 
optimally, the market value of this option could represent up to 100% of the employees’ total DC 
contributions.  In Section I, we develop a framework to analyze the cost of the buy-back option.  
Section II describes the key features of Florida’s reform while Section III outlines the  
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methodology used to analyze this particular reform.  Simulation results are provided in Section 
IV while Section V discusses these results and extensions of the research.     
   
I. The Defined Benefit Buy-Back Option 
  A buy-back option is most easily understood in the context of a pension plan sponsor that 
is converting a DB plan into a DC plan.  In its simplest form, a buy-back option allows an 
employee with a DC plan to return to the DB plan with full benefits at some time t, in exchange 
for a price ) (t P .  The buy-back price  ) (t P  may or may not be identical to  ) (t DC , the balance in 
the worker’s DC account at that time.  The option must be exercised by time R , when the 
employee retires or leaves the plan due to termination.  Throughout the paper, we will use bold 
letters to distinguish random variables from their realized value counterparts. 
This option might seem similar to Margrabe’s (1978) option to exchange one asset for 
another.  In that context, the buy-back option would be interpreted as an option to exchange the 
future DC benefits for the future DB benefits plus a transaction adjustment of  ) ( ) ( t P t DC - .  A 
closer look, however, shows that the analogy with Margrabe’s model fails due to the lack of a 
known market value for the assets exchanged in the buy-back option.
 2  Although the employee 
evaluates the decision of exercising the option at time t, the ultimate value of the assets 
exchanged, and consequently the profitability from exercising the option, will only be known at 
time R . 
  To make further progress in understanding the value of buying-back into the DB plan, it 
is helpful to define the elements needed to analyze the buy-back option: the DB and DC benefits, 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 For a discussion of pensions’ impacts on employer and employee behavior see Mitchell (2000); challenges to the 
defined contribution pension environment are discussed in Mitchell and Schieber (1998).  
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the buy-back price, the payoffs as a function of exercising the option, and the valuation criteria.  
Next we consider a two-step valuation method.  In the first step, the optimal time of exercise for 
the buy-back option is defined concurrently with the payoff structure of the option.  Second, 
using the employee’s optimal buy-back time as an input, the value of the option can be 
determined. 
Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Benefits 
For ease of exposition, consider a new employee hired at the time of plan conversion 
( 0 = t ).
3  Let  ) (t DB  represent the present value of the DB retirement annuity as of time t, 
computed using salary and service at that time, i.e.,  ) (t DB  is the present value of the employee’s 
“Accumulated Benefit Obligation” (ABO).  Similarly,  ) (t DC  is the value of accumulated 
contributions in the DC plan, along with accrued interest, at time t.  Let i represent the random 
investment return in the DC plan.  The terminating employee may either receive his benefit 
payments as an annuity or a lump sum.  While, in reality, the choice of benefit payment might 
affect a particular employee’s relative value of  ) (t DB  and  ) (t DC  in the presence of 
heterogeneity and adverse selection, for now, we assume that the employee is indifferent 
between the two forms of payment; we return to this issue in Section V. 
Figure 1 illustrates the projected expected value profiles for the DB and the DC plans as a 
function of R .  During the employee’s early years of service, the value of the DC benefit 
exceeds the value of the DB benefit.  As the employee nears retirement, however, the buy-back 
becomes more valuable due to the backloaded nature of the DB benefit formula. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 The analogy also fails due to Margrabe’s requirement that the two assets to be exchanged grow according to a 
lognormal distribution to obtain a closed form solution.  Although each contribution in the DC plan grows 












The Defined Benefit Buy-Back Price 
Let  ) (t P  denote the buy-back price; specific cases are examined shortly.  If an 
employee’s DC account is insufficient to cover the buy-back price, he would have to use 
personal funds to cover the shortfall.  If the employee’s DC account exceeded  ) (t P  then he 
retains  ()() DCtPt - .  
Payoffs 
The value of the benefits received by the employee at time R  appears in Table 1, for the 
exercise and no-exercise case.  In the no-exercise case, the payoff is simply  ) (R DC .  In the 
exercise case, the payoffs are a function of the time of exercise t.  The employee receives the 
combination of  ) (R DB  and the difference between the balance of his DC account and the DB 
buy-back price.  Of course, this difference may be positive or negative, and it accrues with 
interest from time t to R .  The employee does not know whether the option will be “in the 
money” when he exercises the option at time  R < t . 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 Below we mention the case where an existing employee has previously accrued benefits at the time of conversion. 
Figure 1. Expected Value of DB and DC Plan Benefits as a 
Function of Years of Service at Termination (R)
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Table 1.  Value of Benefits at time R  as a Function of Time of Exercise (t) 
  Exercise  No Exercise 
Value of Benefit  [ ]( )
t t P t DC
- + - +
R i R DB 1 ) ( ) ( ) (   ) (R DC  
 
Valuation Criteria 
  Because the pension offerings embody payoffs with random components, it is necessary 
to model how their value must be adjusted for risk.  To assess how the employer could value the 
plan cost, it is useful to adopt the risk-neutral valuation technique based on no-arbitrage 
arguments derived from Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) and applied by Hull (1997). The 
approach discounts projected payoffs at the risk-free rate, subject to an adjustment in the drifts of 
each of the random processes determining the value of these payoffs.  For traded securities, the 
resulting risk-adjusted drift corresponds to the risk-free rate.  The operator  E ˆ  represents 
expectations taken with these risk-adjusted probabilities.  
  A different technique is adopted for the employee, since he may be unable to carry out a 
given no-arbitrage strategy.  The employee is assumed to select whether and when to exercise the 
option by maximizing expected utility conditional on the information set available at the time of 
the decision.   
Employee’s Optimal Time of Exercise 
The employee’s optimal buy-back time is denoted by t , which is determined according 
to two criteria.  The first requires that the employee’s expected utility from exercising the option 
at time t is higher than his expected utility from not exercising it.  The second requires that the 
employee cannot foresee another exercise time  t t > *  at which the exercise of the buy-back  
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option produces a higher expected utility.  Hence, t  can be obtained with the following 
equations:
4 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } t t t U t U and U t U t t t t t > " > > £ = * , *) ( ) ( ) ( : min BB BB DC BB R t    (1) 
where,
5 
  [ ]( ) ( ) [ ] t
t
t F t t u E t U | 1 *) ( *) ( ) ( *)) ( ( * - + - + = R i P DC R DB BB   (2) 
and, 
( ) [ ] t t F u E U | ) ( ) ( R DC DC = .  (3) 
Specific utility functions are discussed in Section 3.  To compute the cost of the option, it is 
useful to define an indicator variable  ) (R e , which takes a value of 1 when the option is 
exercised.   
Employer Costs  
The employer’s cost of offering the buy-back option is defined as the increase in the 
discounted value of all pension payments made to (or received from) an employee, on top of the 
DC plan.  The notation can be adapted slightly to recognize that in the DC plan, the employer 
cost is the sum of the DC plan contributions made on behalf of the employee.  Of course, this is 
not equivalent to the employee’s DC account value at any given moment, due to the variable 
nature of most returns.  The term  ) (R DC
er  is used to represent employer contributions when the 
employee spends R  years in the DC plan.  Using the operator  ) (￿ PV  to represent the discounted 
value of the payments made, the employee’s expected cost of the buy-back option at the 
inception of the DC plan can be expressed as: 
                                                 
4 Rather than assuming that this model actually represents all employees’ behavior, the criteria may be interpreted as 
an upper bound for the value of the option. 
5 The probability space is defined by  ) , , ( P ` W  where ` is the standard Brownian motion filtration.  
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    ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 1
price   back - buy   DB
the   and   ons contributi   DC past 
employer   the   between   Difference
er
plan   DB   to   DC   from   transfers   employee
when   benefits   DC   and   DB   between
difference   to   due   gain/loss Employer 
er P DC R R DC R DB R ) ( ) ( ) ( ˆ ) ( ) ( ) ( ˆ t t - + - PV e E PV e E .  (4) 
Equation (4) has two components that clarify the factors influencing the cost of offering 
the option.  The component on the left represents the cost of allowing an employee the 
opportunity to trade his DC for a DB benefit, given that he expects to be better off in the DB 
plan.  Figure 1 clearly indicates that this component becomes valuable only as the employee 
nears retirement; hence it is costless for employees terminating employment early, but 
potentially quite valuable for the most senior employees.  For this reason, the employer’s cost of 
offering a buy-back option is inversely proportional to the plan’s employee turnover rate.  The 
lefthand component of equation (4) also shows that the option cost is higher, the more 
backloaded is the DB promise relative to the DC benefit accrual. 
The right-hand component of equation (4) increases with the difference between the 
value of the DC account and the DB buy-back price.  The employee is likely to exercise the 
option when this value is at a maximum and avoid exercise where this value is significantly 
negative.  
Impact of the Buy-Back Price on Employee Behavior 
  One might wonder what would happen if, instead of charging a buy-back price, the 
employee were permitted to exchange the balance of his DC account for the DB benefit stream.  
In this case, an employee would wait until retirement to make his buy-back decision.  At that 
time, he would receive the maximum of the DC or the DB benefit.  Such a design would 
introduce moral hazard, since the employee could increase the value of the option by electing  
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riskier investments in his DC plan.
 6  One way to address this moral hazard issue would be to 
adopt a buy-back price structure that is correlated with the employee’s DC account balance, but 
independent of the employee’s investment decisions.  For example, the buy-back price could be 
defined as  ) ( ) ( t DC t P
index = , where  ) (t DC
index  is the DC account balance computed with an 
index fund’s return, rather than the employee’s actual investment return.  The difference between 
a perfect guarantee and this new design would then be attributed to “basis risk” (Smetters, 2002). 
 
II. Florida’s Public Pension Reform Plan 
  In what follows we show in more detail how the option values of interest can vary as a 
function of specific plan parameters and employee characteristics.  To illustrate these issues in a 
real-world setting, we use the design and parameters of a buy-back plan recently adopted by the 
state of Florida as part of its statewide public pension reform.   With over $100B in assets and 
600,000 public employees, the Florida Retirement System (FRS) is one of the largest public 
pension plans in the United States.  Until recently, the state’s retirement plan was a fairly typical 
DB pension;
 7  however, the Florida State legislature has adopted a new approach to retirement 
provision as of 2002.  Both current and new employees are offered the alternative of 
participating in an entirely new DC plan.  The old DB plan remains open to current workers and 
is also offered as an option to new hires that chose to join it.  Figure 2 summarizes the key plan 
changes under the reform.  
                                                 
6 Recent analyses of this point include Feldstein and Ranguelova (2000), Pennachi (1998) and Smetters (2000), the 
last of which shows that a minimum benefit guarantee induces investors to hold only risky assets (if capital markets 
are perfect) in their guaranteed DC accounts when those accounts are directly means-tested. 













Existing employees who transfer to the DC plan must also decide how to handle their 
benefits accrued under the old DB plan.  They may either retain a deferred benefit under the old 
DB plan, or they may transfer their ABO
8 to the DC plan.
   Florida’s pension reform bill 
(HB 2393) specifies how the ABO must be computed.  It must use the worker’s salary and 
service at the time of transfer, a discount rate and other actuarial assumptions specified by the 
Florida Retirement System Trust Fund at the time of the transfer, and an assumed retirement age, 
which is no younger than the employee’s current age.
9  
For our purposes, the most interesting aspect of the Florida design is that, after the DC 
plan is launched, the public employee will be granted one subsequent chance to transfer to the 
other plan.
 10  If the employee transfers from the DC to the DB plan, he must pay a price defined 
                                                 
8 The Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO) represents the present value of the employee’s benefit, where the 
current service and the current salaries are used to compute the benefit. 
9 For Regular class employees, the retirement age used for ABO calculations is the lesser of age 62 or the age when 
the employee would have completed 30 years of service (assuming he worked continuously). 
10 Much of the legislation and continuing comment on the HB 2393 Bill is available at www.fsba.state.fl.us and 
www.frs.state.fl.us.  Sections of the Florida Statutes relevant to this analysis include s. 121.021, s. 121.3571, and s. 
121.4501. 
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by the Florida statutes.  This feature is conceptually equivalent to the buy-back option described 
above.   In the original reform bill (HB 2393), the buy-back price was defined as: 
“the sum representing the contributions that would have been made to the DB 
plan for that employee and the actual return that would have been earned on 
those contributions had they been invested in the DB program.” 
 
A year later, before the plan was actually implemented, this was amended by Bill SB 2.  As a 
result, the buy-back price has been changed, setting it according to the employee’s ABO.  The 
exact definition is as follows: 
“a sum representing the present value of that employee’s accumulated benefit 
obligation immediately following the time of such movement, determined 
assuming that attained service equals the sum of service in the defined benefit 
program and service in the Public Employee Optional Retirement Program.  
Benefit commencement occurs on the first date the employee would become 
eligible for unreduced benefits, using the discount rate and other relevant 
actuarial assumptions that were used to value the FRS defined benefit plan 
liabilities in the most recent actuarial valuation.  For any employee who, at the 
time of the second election, already maintains an accrued benefit amount in the 
defined benefit plan, the then present value of such accrued benefit shall be 
deemed part of the required transfer amount described in this subparagraph.” 
 
 
We refer to these buy-back plans as Florida I and Florida II, respectively.  The next section 
computes the value of these two different buy-back options. 
 
III. Assessment Methodology 
  In this section we use numerical simulation to evaluate equation (4) for the Florida I and 
II cases.  This provides estimates of the employer cost of providing the buyback option in the 
two contexts.   
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Heterogeneity of Agents 
  As emphasized in Section I, the value of the buyback option is contingent on how long a 
given employee has been covered by the pension plan to date.  To illustrate how this works, we 
model three types of employees, each of whom is assumed to join the DB plan at age 25.  At the 
time of the conversion, we assume that the three employee types have, respectively, 0 years of 
service, 10 years, or 20 years.  For each of these employee types, we also devise estimates using 
low, medium, and high future termination rates.  The average scenario is close to the pattern of 
actual termination rates for Florida public employees;
11 the low rates are equal to half of the 
average, while the high rates are double average termination rates. 
The Pension Buy-Back Price 
  The FRS is comprised of several groups of employees, each having somewhat different 
benefit rules.  The present analysis focuses on parameters for “regular class” workers, a category 
representing the vast majority of state employees (about 90%).  For these persons, the DB plan 
benefit formula equals 1.6% per year of service, times the average of the worker’s last five 
annual salaries.  The vesting period for the DB benefit is 6 years, in contrast to the DC plan with 
a more lenient 1-year vesting rule.  For the valuation, this implies that new employees can buy-
back a DB benefit only after 6 years of service.
12  The retirement benefit is indexed to a 3% 
nominal rate; as opposed to a real rate; all the remaining economic assumptions are therefore 
expressed in nominal terms.  The normal retirement age (NRA) in the DB plan is the earlier of 
62 years old or 30 years of service.  In our simulations, employees enter the plan at 25 years old 
and hence would be able to retire at their NRA of age 55.  Retirement payouts are assumed to be 
                                                 
11 Average termination rates are derived using data on the number of employees terminating as a function of service 
in 1997-1998 (Trager et al., 2000).  Termination rates are approximately 14% for the first 4 years of service and 6% 
thereafter.  The number of employees per year of service is provided in FRS (1998).  
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life annuities, which for our purposes are converted into lump sums using standard actuarial 
calculations and the relevant discount rate.  Florida’s mortality table has not been published, so 
we use a unisex version of the U.S. UP-94 mortality table. 
  The contribution rate established for the new Florida DC plan has been set at a uniform 9 
percent of pay.  For employees who accrued DB promises at the time of the conversion, one 
must ask whether they will be likely to leave their DB plan benefits with the old plan, or transfer 
their ABOs to the DC plan.  Financially speaking, maintaining a deferred DB benefit makes 
sense to the employees because the current market discount rates are well below the 8 percent 
value that is used by Florida in their ABO calculation.  On the other hand, employees may not 
realize that the ABO calculation does not represent a market value, so they might instead focus 
rather on the convenience of having the transfer and may also expect higher investment returns 
on the pool of funds deriving from the transfers.  We illustrate our results only for the case where 
the employee transfers his ABO to the DC plan, since we believe it may be more plausible and 
the assumption does not affect our conclusions.   
Stochastic Processes and Risk-Neutral Valuation 
To evaluate equations (1) and (4), it is necessary to define the various arguments of these 
formulas as a function of several stochastic processes, including the risk-free rate, investment 
returns in the DC and DB plans, salaries, and the contribution rate in the DB plan.  The DC 
account balance calculation is a straightforward accumulation of contributions with returns.  The 
DB computations use familiar techniques used by pension actuaries (Anderson, 1990).    To 
simplify calculations, we assume that plan contributions, retirement payments, and the buy-back 
option exercise occur at the beginning of each year.  These calculations take into account the 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 Exercise before 6 years is not prohibited, but if employees do so, they will receive nothing if they terminate before 
being vested in the DB plan.  
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specific provisions of the various Florida pension designs.  For each of the five stochastic 
variables defined, we specify that each of these follows an Itô process of the form: 
dz t dt t d i i i i ) , ( ) , ( / q s q m q q + = .  (Estimated values of these stochastic process parameters are 
summarized in Appendix I, along with the corresponding risk-adjusted drifts for each variable, 
defined as  ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ' t t t i i i q ls q m q m - = .)   
The risk-neutral technique is useful because it eliminates arbitrariness in the modeling of 
the key variables in this problem, which are the risk-free rate and the DC plan investment return.  
For investment returns in the DB and DC plans, the adjusted drift is equal to the risk-free rate.  
For the risk-free rate parameters, Hull (1997) suggests that the current term structure leads 
directly to the process followed by interest rates in a risk-neutral world. Adjustments for 
variables unrelated to the price of a traded security are more difficult to determine.  However, as 
Sherris (1995) notes when modeling salary growth in the pension context, the value of the option 
may be fairly insensitive to the drift adjustment assumption.  Hence no adjustment is assumed for 
the salary and DB contribution rate processes.    
Specifying the Utility Function for Plan Participants 
  To model when plan participants might elect to buy back into the DB program, 
conditional on having first chosen the DC, it is necessary to specify a utility function. Following 
Mitchell et al. (1999), we specify a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function at 
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where  ret X  is the value of accumulated pension assets at retirement,  ret W  represents other 
(nonpension) wealth, and  b  reflects the assumed degree of relative risk aversion.  Median 
household wealth at retirement (excluding pension assets) is assumed to be $240,000 (in 2002 
dollars), consistent with nationally representative data from the Health and Retirement Study 
(Moore and Mitchell, 2000).    
  To solve the plan participant’s decision to buy back the DB promise, we substitute 
equation (5) into equation (1).  Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate the optimal solution 
with  b  set to 1 or 2; results below focus on  b   = 1 since the findings are similar. 
 
IV.  Simulation Results 
  Results are generated for the two buy-back option designs outlined for the Florida case by 
simulating equation (4) using a range of values for the model’s five random variables.  For each 
value of  R , we set  R = R  (where R is between the participant’s current age and the retirement 
age), evaluate the employer cost of offering the option using equation (4), weight the results by 
) ( R P = R , and sum them.  The Monte Carlo simulations are repeated 10,000 times.  For each 
draw, the variable representing the timing of the buy-back exercise, t , is obtained by evaluating 
equation (1) by Monte Carlo simulations as well. 
Employer Cost of Providing the Buy-Back Option 
The employer’s cost of offering the buy-back option appears in Table 2, expressed as a 
percentage of the employee’s salary to facilitate comparisons with the employer’s 9% of pay 
contribution rate for the DC plan.  Reported buy-back costs thus calculated reflect the cash flow 
required to finance offering this option over the worker’s tenure at the firm, computed from his 
hire date.  The computation requires that the option can only be exercised after the DC plan is  
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instituted – for the new hire, after 0 years of service, and for existing employees, after 10 and 20 
years of service.   
Table 2. Employer Cost of the Buy-Back Option* (% of total salary from hire to retirement) 
  Employment Termination Probability   
  Low    Average    High   
  Florida I  Florida II    Florida I  Florida II    Florida I  Florida II   
25 years old / 
0 year service 
6.1%  12.7%    3.6%  9.5%    1.1%  5.2% 
 
35 years old / 
10 years service 
10.2%  10.2%    7.6%  7.6%    3.9%  3.9% 
 
45 years old / 
20 years service 
8.5%  8.5%    5.7%  5.7%    2.1%  2.1% 
 
*  These costs represent maxima assuming optimal exercise of the option: actual costs could be lower.  Results 
assume  b  =1. 
 
The results in Table 2 indicate that, for average termination probabilities (consistent with 
actual rates in Florida public service), the additional employer cost associated with offering a 
buy-back option is substantial, from 4 to 10 percent of annual salary for the worker’s entire 
tenure.  This is significant compared to the 9 percent DC contribution rate.  Recalling the 
decomposition of equation (4), the first component implied that employer cost would rise with 
employee seniority and fall with termination rates.  This pattern is confirmed in Table 2: 
compared to the middle column, a doubling in termination probabilities cuts the buy-back cost 
by about 4 percent of salary, and halving the termination probability increases buy-back costs by 
3 percent of salary. 
Thus far, our analysis has not emphasized what would happen to current employees who 
had a benefit in the DB plan when they transferred to the DC plan.  Under the Florida reform 
rules the DB benefit would be “frozen” and computed with salaries in effect at the time of the 
conversion.  If such an employee bought back into the DB plan, he would receive an additional  
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benefit due to the recalculation of his past DB benefit using updated salaries.  In Table 2, the 
employee with 10 years of service is the one most advantaged by this feature, which explains his 
higher costs.  This cost is obviously higher than for the person with 0 years of service who does 
not benefit from recalculation.  But the cost is also higher relative to the person with 20 years of 
service who is close to retirement and, therefore, does not face as many recalculation years 
before retirement. 
The second component of the option valuation equation (4) predicted that option costs are 
affected by the difference between the employer’s DC contributions and the DB buy-back price.  
Figure 3 below illustrates how this portion of the cost changes as a function of the buy-back 










* See equation (1). 
Under the Florida I plan, the buy-back price was equal to whatever the DB 
contribution rates actually were, plus realized rates of return on the DB plan investments.  In this 
case, this second component of equation (4) always traces out a negative value in Figure 3, and 
the size of the gap rises with seniority.  As a result, employees would be anticipated to always 
Figure 3.  Expected Difference Between Employer Contributions and 
Buy-Back Price*, as a Function of Buy-Back Time t











































































exercise their option as soon as they were permitted to do so.  Senior employees would exercise 
the option immediately, while new hires would wait to be vested in the DB plan before 
exercising the option (after six years). 
Under Florida II, the buy-back price corresponds to the employee’s ABO.  The evolution 
of the second component becomes somewhat more complex, starting out at zero, rising to attain 
a peak, and then becoming negative.  The maximum cost is attained when the employee buys 
back after 12 years of service in the plan, and interestingly, it is quite large in magnitude.  This 
explains why, for a new employee, the costs for Florida II as a percentage of salary are about 6% 
higher than for Florida I.  For senior employees, the second component is close to zero when the 
DC plan is introduced and it declines thereafter.  As a result, senior employees would be 
predicted to exercise the option immediately. 
Additional Remarks On Florida’s Buy-Back Guarantee 
  The modeling of the Florida guarantees outlined thus far abstracts from a few 
complexities.  In practice, Florida’s employees are permitted to choose either plan initially: when 
the DC plan is first instituted, and once again thereafter.  As a consequence, employees who elect 
the DC plan initially will likely be those most advantaged by this choice.  Therefore one might 
expect some selection: employees for whom the combination of the two components of equation 
(4) is high would be most likely to take the buy-back under the Florida II design.  This is likely 
to exacerbate cost increases due to the reform.   
It is interesting that the legislators’ intent was probably to reduce the cost of the option by 
moving from the old to the new Florida plan.  Most likely, policymakers worried about 
employees nearing retirement who could buy back the DB benefit for less than its ABO value 
under Florida I, prompting solvency problems.  However this analysis shows that the second plan  
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may be more costly than the first, since boosting the buy-back price relative to the DC account 
balance near retirement unexpectedly reduces this price earlier in the employee’s career.  Since 
the buy-back price is expected to be less than the DC account balance at the optimal buy-back 
time, employees can keep the difference.
13 
 
V. Discussion and Conclusions  
When a plan sponsor moves from offering a defined benefit to a defined contribution 
pension plan, this may create a demand for a form of guarantee to protect plan participants 
against a sharp decline in retirement benefits.  Our analysis indicates that offering employees an 
opportunity to buy back the DB benefit requires balancing participant protection and employer 
costs.  In particular, adding a guarantee to a DC plan can result in employer costs greater than 
those associated with the original DB plan, instead of achieving cost savings.  Under the buy-
back options considered here, employees continue to have access to the old DB plan benefits, for 
a price.  Participants in these plans must therefore assess how the gap evolves between the DC 
account balance and the buy-back price evolves over time.  If the buy-back price falls below the 
DC account balance at any time during an employee’s career, he may receive a windfall.  
  Two buy-back designs have been explored by the State of Florida for its statewide public 
employee pension plan.  The formula actually adopted permits participants to buy back their DB 
benefits in exchange for the value of their ABOs.  Our results indicate that this design is 
potentially costly if the employees were to exercise the buy-back option optimally.  In that case, 
the market value of the buy-back option could represent up to 100% of the DC contributions.     
The source of these costs can be illustrated in Figure 4, which depicts a newly hired worker with 
                                                 
13 In s. 121.571 (4) of the Florida statutes, the FRS has specified the creation of a reserve corresponding to the gain  
from the original transfer of the employees from the DB to the DC plan.  This reserve shall be used to offset the  
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a starting salary of $30,000.  We illustrate the benefits the employee would get if he terminated 
employment either in the DC plan or in the DB plan.  (DC plan benefits are projected with a rate 
of return of 8%.)  In addition, Figure 4 illustrates the return to a strategy of selecting the DC plan 
initially and then buying back into the DB plan after 16 years.
14  This employee would obtain a 
bonus of about $50,000 from the buy-back exercise, an amount that accumulates to $115,000 by 
the time he reaches retirement.  In this case, the mixed strategy of selecting the DC plan and then 
buying back the DB benefit after 16 years dominates the maximum of the DC and DB benefits at 












Our model could be extended in various ways.  For instance, participants will have to 
become knowledgeable about when the various options are most valuable; if participants lack the 
necessary financial tools, their pension choices could deviate from those hypothesized here.  
                                                                                                                                                             
impact of employees exercising their second program election.  However, it may not correspond to the actual costs 
of the buy-back option in practice. 
Figure 4. Benefits of a DC Plan with a Buy-Back Option 
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Alternative decision-making approaches might also lead to different employee choices than the 
ones used here.
15  Some employees might face liquidity constraints preventing them from buying 
back their DB plan, if their DC account balance proves insufficient to cover the buy-back price.  
Retirees might have preferences how pension benefits are paid; for example, if a retiree is 
overannuitized or simply prefers liquidity, he might remain in the DC plan rather than exercise 
the buy-back option.  Annuitization costs would also play a role: generally group annuities are 
less costly than individual purchases (Mitchell et al., 1999), making the DB plan relatively more 
appealing.   
In addition, this simulation model assumes that employees follow an optimal buy-back 
strategy; however, employer costs could be much lower if employees did not pursue this tack.  
This prediction and model sensitivity could be investigated with evidence on Florida’s state 
employee plan elections.  The approach could also be adapted to assess other DC guarantee 
designs such as the Ohio State Teacher’s Retirement System which recently offered its 401(a) 
participants a DC investment fund with a guaranteed annual return of at least 7.75 percent.  
Looking further afield, the Chilean government mandates a national DC pension plan while at 
the same time it guarantees an unfunded minimum retirement benefit (Zarita, 1994).  This type 
of guarantee is subject to moral hazard, since workers will have an incentive to invest in risky 
assets so as to boost the value of the guarantee option (Pennacchi, 1999; Mitchell and Barreto, 
1997).  In the Florida case examined here, this moral hazard does not arise since the buy-back 
price relies only on DB plan parameters, rather than on DC account values. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 Note that the buy-back time is not necessarily optimal and is chosen simply for illustration purposes. 
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Appendix I  Stochastic Processes and Formulas for Value and Cost 
 
Our model has a total of five random variables, each following an Itô process of the form 
dz t dt t d i i i i ) , ( ) , ( / q s q m q q + = .  See Table A1 below gives the definition of each of the 
variables as well as their parameters estimates.  We also define  ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ' t t t i i i q ls q m q m - =  as 
the drift for the risk-adjusted processes.  Justification for model choices and their parameter 
values is given below. 
 
Table A1: Parametric Form and Parameters Estimates (All Variables Nominal) 
    ) , ( t i q m   ) , ( ' t i q m   ) , ( t i q s  
Risk-Free Rate  dr   r r / ) ( - m k   r r / ) ( - m k   r / s  
    5 . 0 = k  
% 6 = m  
% 6 0 = r  
5 . 0 = k  
% 6 = m  
% 6 0 = r  
% 10 = s  
Salary  dS   m   ls m -   s  
    % 75 . 4 = m   % 75 . 4 = m  
% 0 = ls  
% 2 = s  
Investment Returns in DB Plan   DB dR   m   ) (t r   s  
    % 8 = m   ) (t r  (defined above)  % 10 = s  
Investment Returns in DC Plan   DC dR   m   ) (t r   ( )
dz
dz dz Dc DB R R
2 1 r r s - +
 
      % 8 = m   ) (t r  (defined above)  % 10 = s  
% 90 = r  
Contribution Rate to DB Plan  DB dC   m   ls m -   s  
    % 11 0 =
DB C  
% 0 = m  
% 11 0 =
DB C  
% 0 = -ls m  
% 10 = s  
 
  According to Hull (1997), the current term structure leads directly to the process followed 
by interest rates in the risk-neutral world.  As of August 2000, the nominal and real yield curves 
were approximately flat with respective yields of 6% and 4%, producing an expected inflation 
estimate of 2%.  In the special case of a flat yield curve, the difference between the various yield 
curve models narrows considerably.  In that context, we can ignore the usual critique regarding 
the ability of Cox-Ingersoll-Ross to model short-rates and choose it as our yield curve model.  
The parameters  0 r  and  m  are chosen to match the current yield curve while k  and s  are 
estimated using historical data on T-Bills.  
 
24
  For the salary drift, we add the inflation assumption (2%) to the productivity (1.5%) and 
average merit (1.25%) assumptions as described in Trager et al. (2000) and the FRS (1999).  The 
volatility parameter is estimated from historical inflation data.  Inflation volatility ranges from 
1% to 4% and a parameter of 2% is chosen to reflect the relatively low volatility in the most 
recent period.  We set the market premium of risk to zero since Sherris (1995) showed that in a 
similar problem, the value of the option was not very sensitive to that assumption. 
  The drift for the rate of return in the DB plan was chosen to match the return assumption 
of 8% used by Florida in its state pension plan actuarial valuation.  The risk-adjusted drift is 
simply the risk-free rate since we are dealing with the price of a traded security.  The volatility 
assumption is estimated at 10%, using historical returns during the postwar period and Florida’s 
investment policy.  We use the same assumptions for the DC investment returns.  The nuance is 
that we add a parameter  r  representing the correlation between the DC and DB investment 
returns.  We set  r  to be 90% since the returns in both plans should be closely but not perfectly 
correlated. 
  Finally, the contribution rate in the DB plan is the most difficult process to model since it 
represents the result of a complex combination of accounting, actuarial, and economic variables.  
Contrary to the DC counterpart, the DB contribution rate is variable rather than fixed over time.  
Hence a volatility parameter is required; to estimate it, we use the historical volatility of the 
contribution rate in the Florida DB plan which is 10%.  Determining the drift of the process is 
more complex.  The DB plan contribution rate is currently about 9% and it is anticipated that this 
rate will rise after the reform, based on adverse selection that will be introduced by the optional 
DC plan.  Employees remaining in the DB plan will likely be a relatively more expensive group 
than the original plan population.  The simulations assume that after the conversion, the 
contribution rate will increase at 11% and follow a random walk thereafter.  We have no 
particular view on the adjustment for the drift and hence it is set at zero;  this should not strongly 
influence results. 
   